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1. Introduction 
The global financial crisis of 2008 brought to the fore issues of financial sector regulation. 
But its consequences for the poor of the world also fuelled an ongoing discussion and 
debate on social protection. Protection for the poor in the face of macroeconomic crises is 
just one aspect of social protection. Other macro crises such a natural disasters also have 
severe consequences for the poor. And, alongside the macro shocks, are the ordinary micro 
level shocks like health and work accidents which are important in the daily lives of the 
poor. Social protection in the face of a whole range of shocks is now firmly on the policy 
agenda. 
 
This paper presents a broad overview of the main areas of consensus and challenges in the 
analytical and policy discourse on social protection. A simple framework for locating 
consensus and challenges is to begin by thinking of wellbeing outcomes (measured perhaps 
by income or consumption) as depending on (a) medium term factors like assets and access 
to opportunities, (b) insurance mechanisms to cope with short term shocks and (c) the 
magnitude of the consequences of the shocks even after insurance mechanisms have come 
into play. The reason for worrying about the consequences of shocks is twofold. First is the 
straightforward consequence on wellbeing in the short term. Second, however, is the fact 
that the short term impacts can translate into medium term negative impacts on assets, 
opportunities and wellbeing? 
 
In this framework, improving the wellbeing of the poorest thus depends on (i) increasing 
their assets and opportunities in the medium term, (ii) improving insurance mechanisms 
and (iii) addressing the actual outcome of shocks when they hit. However, two sets of 
issues arise. First, the interventions in each category have consequences for the other 
categories. For example:  public interventions in (ii) could diminish private arrangements, 
leaving (iii) unchanged; public intervention in (iii) is implicitly like intervention in (ii); 
intervention in (i) also helps with (iii). Second, given limited public resources, where is it 
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best to use them—(i), (ii) or (iii)? It is not good enough to duck the question and to say do 
all three. Even if this was valid, it would beg the question—in what combination?1 
 
It will become clear that many of the challenges facing the social protection community 
arise from the issues introduced above, and this paper will discuss a number of these 
challenges. However, the paper begins by highlighting three areas where there appears to 
be consensus. Four areas of challenges are then discussed. 
 
2. Consensus I: Importance of Risk and Volatility 
The analysis of poverty and inequality has undergone a data revolution in the last twenty 
five years. It is now difficult to picture the paucity of data that analysts were faced with two 
or three decades ago. The World Bank’s Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS) 
website lists over 60 surveys from more than 30 countries—all of these are from after the 
mid-1980s. The Demographic and Health Survey program has equally transformed the data 
landscape, providing a wealth of information on many dimensions of human development. 
Micro data for Africa have become available in ever greater quantities, to add to the data 
from countries like India. Perhaps most important for the analysis of risk and volatility has 
been the development of panel data sets for a whole range of countries, including those in 
Africa. 
 
This data revolution has made possible detailed and specific analysis of risk and volatility 
in wellbeing outcomes—quantification of its extent, and assessment of its causes and 
consequences. Further, there has been a coming together of qualitative and quantitative 
research, building on the strengths of each tradition to further sharpen the analysis. 
 
Although there are many possible illustrations of the surge in research and policy analysis 
of risk and vulnerability, two will suffice for our purposes. First is the symposium on 
Shocks and Vulnerability in the Journal of Development Studies (Volume 45, Issue 6, 
2009). This collection of six papers ranges from the effects of rainfall uncertainty in Nepal 
                                                 
1 Of course this begs the bigger question of how much society should spend on social protection as a whole, 
but this takes us beyond the scope of this paper.  
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(Menon, 2009), through health risks in Pakistan (Heltburg and Lund, 2009), and 
vulnerability in fishing communities in Congo (Bene, 2009). The paper by Heltburg and 
Lund (2009) builds on earlier panel data analysis for Pakistan (for example, Alderman, 
1996), but uses a cross-section survey with a module that asks retrospectively about shocks. 
They find “high incidence and cost of shocks borne by households, with health and other 
idiosyncratic shocks dominating in frequency, costliness, and adversity. Sample households 
lack effective coping options and use mostly self-insurance and informal credit. Many 
shocks result in food insecurity, informal debts, child and bonded labour, and recovery is 
slow. Private and public social safety nets exist but offer little effective protection.” 
(Heltburg and Lund, 2009, p. 889) 
 
Second, more in the realm of policy reports and global syntheses is The Chronic Poverty 
Report 2008-09 (CPRC, 2009). However, even this report shows what it owes to the 
availability of panel data when it highlights the basic point that static poverty measures can 
mask significant poverty dynamics:  “Consider, for example, the significant reduction of 
24% in aggregate poverty apparent in rural Vietnam between 1993 and 1998. This tells us 
nothing about what happened to individual households. In fact, while about 30% of 
households moved out of poverty, another 5% fell into poverty (together considered as the 
transitorily poor), and about one-third of the population was poor in both periods.” (CPRC, 
2009, p. 5) 
 
There is now no disagreement that the poor in developing countries do indeed face a 
significant range of shocks, that they have developed mechanisms and responses to address 
these shocks, that these mechanisms are inadequate and leave a significant amount of risk 
uncovered, that these uncovered shocks and responses to them have medium term 
detrimental consequences, and that this is therefore a need for public intervention to 
provide protection against risk and volatility. 
 
At the macro level, evidence and agreement has accumulated on increased growth volatility 
compared to the “golden age” of growth from 1945 to 1979. Di Giovanni and Levchenko 
(2008) and Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2005) are only two examples of papers in this 
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genre. While higher growth is indeed associated with lower growth volatility, the first 
paper finds an association between trade openness and greater volatility, while the second 
paper finds that “both trade and financial integration significantly  weaken this negative 
relationship” (p. 176).  Formal statistical evidence has been strengthened by public and 
policy makers’ perceptions of the consequences of the global financial crises of 1997 and 
2008. Furthermore, evidence and agreement has also grown on the greater volatility in 
climate, and the increasing ease of spread of infectious disease because of labor 
movements. These can both lead to macro level shocks with consequences for economies 
as a whole and thus for the poor in those economies. 
 
3. Consensus II:  Systems Not Programs 
Findings such as those by Hultberg and Lund (2009) on the ineffectiveness of public social 
protection programs and interventions do not mean that these programs do not exist. Quite 
the contrary. In fact most countries have a bewildering range of interventions that fall under 
the label of social protection. Even focusing on just one institution and on the narrowly 
defined category of social safety nets, during 2000-2010 the World Bank “loaned $11.5 
billion to support such programs in 244 loans to 83 countries” (IEG 2011, p. xi). For any 
given country, a range of programs, under different ministries and different budget 
headings, all contribute directly or indirectly to social protection. 
 
Indeed, programs that are not on the face of it designed to be social protection against 
shocks can play a role in protecting the vulnerable against shocks. One example of this is 
the well known Progresa/Oportunidades program in Mexico, which is primarily designed to 
provide incentives to keep children in school. The essence of the program is that in return 
for verified attendance at school over a given period, a cash transfer is made to the 
household. The program has been evaluated and found to be highly successful in meeting 
its objectives (Levy, 2006). However, consider now the implications of the fact that the 
program is targeted to poor households. If there is a shock—at the micro or macro level--
which results in the head of a household losing income, then this household is likely to fall 
into the target group and to begin to receive cash transfers as part of the program. Of course 
the transfer is conditional on keeping children in school, but it is nevertheless a transfer to 
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the household which has suffered a shock. Indirectly, therefore, it is a form of social 
insurance. 
 
There are many such examples in every country. The main conclusion is that a program by 
program assessment of social protection, important though that is, will be an incomplete 
analysis of social protection in the country as a whole. Elsewhere I have proposed the 
institution of a Social Protection Assessment Program (SPAP) for each country, led by the 
government but perhaps with the assistance of the agencies such as the World Bank 
(Kanbur, 2010a). Such an assessment would begin by an institutional description of the 
widest possible set of government programs and interventions that can provide, directly or 
indirectly, protection against shocks at the micro and macro level. The second stage of the 
assessment would examine the overlaps and interactions between the programs—for 
example, whether some programs kick in simultaneously (perhaps in uncoordinated 
fashion) when a shock hits. Such an assessment would also identify portions of the 
population that are uncovered or under-covered by social protection.  
 
I have argued (Kanbur, 2010a) that a further piece of analysis could be conducted 
analogously to the World Bank and IMF’s Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP). 
An FSAP essentially “imagines” macro shocks and traces through the consequences for the 
financial sector, identifying vulnerabilities. Such “stress testing” is now common place in 
the macro/financial setting. But it could equally well be done in the social protection 
context—tracing through the consequences of potential macro level shocks on incomes of 
the poor, and how existing programs and interventions do or do not protect against a range 
of these shocks. Such analysis could then identify actions to close the gaps. 
 
The more general point behind these specific points and proposals, a point on which there 
appears to be consensus, is that we need to see social protection in terms of systems, not 
individual programs. Of course, implementation will ultimately be through programs and 
interventions, and care will need to be taken to design and evaluate these in their own 
terms. But the overall frame needs to be one of the system as a whole, with all relevant 
institutions working together to provide social protection for the poorest. 
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4. Consensus III: Global Assistance for Crisis Response 
The SPAP discussed in the previous section can lay the ground work for a systemic view of 
social protection in the face of micro and macro level shocks. It can highlight gaps in the 
system and thus frame actions to rationalize and coordinating programs as well as 
investment in new programs to serve under-covered populations. However, even if such 
investment is undertaken in setting up systems, a key issue is whether resources will be 
available to finance higher levels of support when a crisis strikes. 
 
The issue of resources arises both when the crisis strikes and when it recedes--will the 
political economy allow resources to be withdrawn when the crisis passes? Kanbur (2010a) 
contrasts generalized food (and fuel) subsidies and employment guarantee programs in this 
regard. The political economy of generalized subsidies is relatively easy on the 
expansionary side because they benefit a wide range of the population; it is of course 
politically more difficult to withdraw the subsidies precisely for this reason. Public works 
programs, on the other hand, are self-targeting. Since they offer employment at a given 
(relatively low) wage, there will only be demand at the time of crisis. As the crisis abates 
and wages and employment in the economy pick up, the workers would leave the public 
works sites for better opportunities. The difficulty, rather, is in ensuring sufficient budget 
for the wage bill at the time of crisis—and precisely because the program is self-targeted to 
the poor, it will not have widespread support unlike generalized food subsidies. 
 
Mindful of these political difficulties with public works programs, coalition partners in 
India’s “UPA-I” government in 2004 enacted an “Employment  Guarantee Act” so as to 
bind government to finding the budget at times of crises. However, this is an issue that also 
faces the international community, which is called on to provide support at times of crises. 
The experience of the food price crisis of the early 2000s, and then the financial crisis of 
the late 2000s, has been salutary, and has led to a consensus on the importance of rapid 
response and availability of resources when the crisis strikes. In fact, this was a key finding 
of Cornia, Jolly and Stewart (1987) a quarter of a century ago. 
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In Kanbur (2010a) I argue that the key to such support is that it has to be pre-qualified. All 
the preparation work has to have been done before, the amounts and triggers for tranche 
releases set out in advance, so that the whole process does not in start only when the crisis 
hits. There are in fact some instruments which can be further enhanced to address this need. 
For example, the World Bank’s Deferred Drawdown Option (DDO) is one such instrument 
available to wealthier countries eligible for IBRD borrowing. For poorer countries, the 
World Bank’s soft loan arm IDA has introduced a Crisis Response Window (CRW) with 
accelerated approval process. It is hoped that this window will be broadened, and the 
process moved closer to a pre-qualification of the type that is available for the DDO, where 
the agreement is made in “normal times” and the drawdown can come whenever the crisis 
strikes. 
 
5. Challenge I: Redistribution versus Insurance 
The various elements of consensus described above, especially the broad agreement on the 
extent of risk and vulnerability faced by the poor, and on the need for social protection, 
provide a good platform for global action. However, there remain a series of challenges and 
disagreement as we move to further analysis and especially to implementation. The next 
sections will review some of these issues and challenges. 
 
The first of these issues can be posed I the form of a question:  Is Social Protection 
primarily Insurance or is it Redistribution? In Kanbur (2010b) I highlight the strong 
overlaps between social security and income redistribution schemes, and the difficulties of 
disentangling the two in practice.  
 
Consider first of all a standard progressive tax system where payments rise 
disproportionately with income, starting with a subsidy at the lower end, financed by tax 
payments at the upper end. For simplicity, suppose that the system is self-financing. This 
system, the epitome of redistribution, in fact provides insurance in a world where incomes 
are risky. A negative shock leading to a shortfall of incomes leads to lower taxes, perhaps 
even to a subsidy if income after the shock is low enough. By the same token, a positive 
shock attracts a higher average tax rate. The variance of post-tax income is lowered, 
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reducing risk. In effect, the tax system is providing insurance. In a previous section I have 
also highlighted how conditional cash transfer programs can also, in effect, provide 
insurance against shocks to income, even though their stated objective is not at all to do so. 
Now consider a relatively standard social security program such as unemployment 
insurance. For this to be pure insurance contribution should match benefits actuarially—
over the long run, inflows and outflows have to be balanced in an appropriate sense. If they 
are not, for example if benefits exceed contributions, the difference has to be made up from 
somewhere, presumably from general taxation. The overall system then involves, alongside 
insurance among workers in the scheme, redistribution to those in the scheme from the 
average taxpayer. If the excess is funded from, say, a tax on firms, then one would have to 
work out the incidence of this tax to assess the overall nature of the redistribution—but 
redistribution there will be. 
 
The redistribution can be regressive, or progressive. Many so called social security 
programs for formal sector workers in developing countries are not actuarially balanced. 
They require regular injections of resources from the fisc. Since in many cases (for 
example schemes that cover highly paid government or state owned enterprise employees) 
the beneficiaries are richer than average, these schemes are highly regressive redistributive 
programs. On the other hand, other schemes, for example those that provide micro 
insurance to small scale informal sector enterprises, are also not self-financing but require 
external financing from government resources. In this case the redistribution is progressive. 
With this inherent overlap between insurance and redistribution in social protection, the 
challenge to the SP community is thus: 
– (i) analytically, to estimate the insurance and the redistribution components of each 
program, or the system of programs. 
– (ii) politically, to not hide behind the more palatable “insurance” label but to be 
explicit about the redistributive dimension of social protection (positive or 
negative).  
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6. Challenge II: LICs versus MICs 
It seems to be generally accepted that government social protection programs are more 
widespread in Middle income Countries (MICs) than in Low Income Countries (LICs). 
This is not easy to establish quantitatively, not least because of the difficulties of defining 
what comes under the umbrella of social protection. However, one recent but indirect 
quantification comes from an evaluation of World Bank supported social safety net (SSN) 
programs during the decade 2000-2010 (IEG 2011, p. 12):  “The Bank lending, analytical, 
and capacity building support for SSNs was significantly more concentrated in MICs than 
LICs throughout the decade.” Taking World Bank lending as a whole, 13% of World Bank 
projects in MICs were devoted to SSNs, while the figure for LICs was 6%.  
 
In view of this stylized fact, an obvious set of questions arise. Is this the “natural” order of 
things? Can social protection only be “afforded” once the LIC/MIC threshold is crossed? Is 
the greater spread of social protection programs in MICs because they are better 
implementable in MICs than in LICs? There is a straightforward response to the 
“affordability” question. It is that in fact protection against shocks is of particular 
importance to the poorest of the poor, because for these it is protection against risk and 
vulnerability that stands between the next shock and destitution. So, if anything, the need 
for social protection is greater among the poorest, and in the poorest countries. In fact, 
anticipating the arguments in the next section, the likelihood of market failure in insurance 
is likely to be greater in the weak institutional environments of LICs, further underlining 
the need for state support in these areas. 
 
Institutional development is of course key, linking back to the earlier argument about 
taking a systemic view of social protection. Two pieces of evidence throw interesting light 
on this issue. First, 57% of the World Bank’s SSN operations in MICs emphasized 
institution building, while only 24% in LICs did so. However, at the same time, the 
performance of SSN projects in MICs and LICs was similar, in fact LICs did marginally 
better—using the well-established scale of the World Bank’s Independent Evaluation 
Group, 88% of projects score “Moderately Satisfactory” or better in LICs, while the 
number was 85% for MICs. This may well be because fewer of the projects in LICs were 
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geared towards institution building, which is more difficult and likely to result in less 
favorable project ratings. In any event, there does not seem to be a prima facie case for not 
engaging in building up social protection systems in LICs, where the need for them is 
equally great if not greater. 
 
In light of the above, the challenge for the social protection community is to (i) argue that 
redistribution is required as much if not more in LICs than in MICs, (ii) show that there is 
indeed successful SP program implementation in LICs (e.g. the recent( IEG, 2011) review 
of SSNs), and (iii) To assess the characteristics of successful social protection programs in 
LICs with a view to scaling up their implementation, which would of course reveal that the 
nature of success will vary from country to country and a “one-size-fits-all” solution is not 
appropriate. 
 
7. State versus Private Insurance 
Prior to any government social protection intervention, families, communities and markets 
will have developed various ingenious insurance mechanisms. They are of course wholly 
inadequate, but they exist. Their presence raises three challenges for the social protection 
community: (i) to encourage expansion of these mechanisms, or introduce state 
mechanisms directly? (ii) if the former, how to encourage them? (iii) if the latter, what 
happens to the existing mechanisms? 
 
There is a natural tendency in the social protection community, and this paper has been no 
exception, to draw a line from market and community failure in the provision of adequate 
protection to the case for direct state intervention by setting up social protection programs. 
The failures of the market in provision of insurance are well known. Moral hazard means 
that insurance provision will not be complete. Adverse selection means that insurance 
markets may fail to exist altogether. Imposition of risk sharing, through requiring 
participation by state provision, is one solution to this. However, this perspective glides too 
easily over the issue of state failure. In particular, the political economy of elite capture is 
not as much discussed by advocates of social protection as perhaps it should be. I have 
already discussed how schemes that are ostensibly social insurance can turn out to be 
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highly effective mechanisms for regressive redistribution--from the poor to the rich. While 
being alert to these issues, the social protection community needs also to weigh up the 
alternative of supporting and expanding community level and civil society managed 
insurance and protection schemes. 
 
How can the state support existing schemes, rather than supplant them with a full blown 
government alternative? The experience of the Indian Self Employed Women’s 
Association (SEWA) is instructive. SEWA is a civil society organization which works to 
support livelihoods and empowerment of women who work in the informal sector in India 
(www.sewa.org). Insurance is a key dimension of this support, provided through Vimo 
SEWA (www.sewainsurance.org). Cover is provided for a range of contingencies including 
death, accident, widowhood, illness and maternity. More than 60,000 women and their 
families are insured. SEWA’s ground level organization provides the infrastructure for 
servicing the needs, claims validation, etc. for women. There is state support with subsidies 
to premiums through programs of support to micro-insurance. However, in other 
dimensions state regulations are a hindrance to the operation of Vimo SEWA. The 
fundamental issue is that insurance regulations are written with large insurers in mind, and 
are not geared to small scale micro-insurance programs like those of SEWA. Specifically, 
the capital requirements for insurers promulgated by the Insurance Regulation and 
Development Authority (IRDA) are too big for a micro-insurer like SEWA. The result is 
that Vimo SEWA has to operate under cooperatives legislation and cannot expand to gain 
the benefits of scale. There is an ongoing dialogue in India, which has had to proceed in the 
difficult atmosphere of recent scandals associated with private sector micro-insurance 
firms. Here is a case, then, where the state could support the development of civil society 
insurance mechanism through intelligent redesign of regulations. 
  
The introduction of state mechanisms will affect existing non-state mechanisms. Subsidy 
for a non-state mechanism will affect the conditions for those non-sate mechanisms that are 
not subsidized. In general, it may be assumed that non-subsidized non-state mechanisms 
will shrink in response. This is natural. Existing mechanisms were inadequate and needed 
to be supplemented. But the presence of alternatives will reduce the incentives for current 
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mechanisms. The central point for the social protection community, however, is to guard 
against the tendency to overstate the benefits of a given state social protection program by 
focusing on the gross benefits of the program. Of course, these had better be positive—
otherwise the program will not pass the social cost-benefit test. However, the net social 
protection provided, after subtracting the shrinkage or disappearance of existing 
mechanisms, is bound to be less than the gross benefit. Yet the standard procedure in the 
social protection discourse is indeed to focus on the gross benefits of a program and not on 
its net benefits, the calculation of which would require an analysis of the response of 
community and market mechanisms to state intervention. 
 
8. Conditional versus Unconditional Transfers 
Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) are all the rage now. Although they have been part of 
the policy makers’ toolkit for many years in Asia, well documented successful experiences 
in Latin America in from the mid-1990s onwards have put them on to a new global footing. 
Most Latin American countries now have them, and they have spread to other parts of the 
world—and indeed reintroduced to Asia (Fiszbein and Schady, 2009). They have been 
evaluated using rigorous methods and found to deliver what they promise—for example, 
the impact of Mexico’s Progresa/Oportunidades is indeed to reduce school dropouts, per its 
main objective (Levy, 2006 and Fiszbein and Schady, 2009). They are seen as an 
indispensable part of social protection. 
 
The somewhat unconditional support for CCTs is disconcerting. There seems to be very 
little questioning of them in the policy discourse. One is reminded of a similar situation 
with microfinance fifteen years ago. A more sober assessment of the microfinance 
phenomenon and its impact on the poor is now coming into view. In particular, there are 
questions about whether the benefits flow to the poorest of the poor. So, here is a challenge 
for the social protection community on CCTs—at least on the first C, conditionality. 
The basic structure of a CCT is as follows. First, identify target households. Second, define 
“good behavior” (for example, keeping kids in school, attending ante-natal health clinics, 
etc.) and monitor this behavior. Third, those who achieve a given behavioral standard 
receive a cash transfer. But what if the behavioral standard is more likely to be attained by 
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wealthier households? Typically, for example, “education” and “health” are “normal 
goods” i.e. households demand more of these as they get wealthier. Then, clearly, CCTs 
have an inbuilt regressivity. There is some evidence, for example, that the take up rates in 
Mexico’s Progresa/Oportunidades CCT are much lower for the poorest of the eligible 
households (Rodriguez, 2011). It can also be shown theoretically (Rodriguez, 2011) that 
with a fixed budget unconditional cash transfers (UCTs) reduce the depth of income 
poverty by more than CCTs. This result also holds for “education poverty”, in other words 
when the objective is reduce the shortfalls from a target level of years of schooling. 
 
So the SP community must ask itself--what exactly is the gain of the first “C” in “CCT”? 
– Clearly, conditioning moves behavior in the direction of the conditioning. There is a 
mountain of evidence on this, but this is perhaps not that surprising. The real 
question is—what would UCTs, with the same budget, achieve in terms average 
behavioral change and progressivity of this change? We do not have an extensive 
and systematic set of answers to this question. 
– If, as seems possible from the analysis of Rodriguez (2011), CCTs are more likely 
to be regressive than UCTs, is the gain from conditioning political in nature, 
assuaging middle class concerns about “handouts” versus “investment”? Of course, 
in reality a UCT may improve the schooling of the poorest even more than a CCT 
(with the same budget), but this may cut no ice in the political arena, where the 
notion of the poor being seen to do something in return for the cash they get may 
hold sway.2 
9. Conclusion 
The social protection literature and policy discourse is now vast, and it would be 
impossible to do a comprehensive review and to do justice to the myriad strands and 
perspectives one finds. Rather, my objective here has been to identify some areas of 
consensus and challenges in the social protection community—as I see them. 
                                                 
2 Even where CCTs do better than UCTs on schooling, they do not necessarily do better on other dimensions 
such as teenage pregnancy (Baird, McIntosh and Ozler, 2011). See also Schubert and Slater, 2006. 
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I have argued that there is now indeed a consensus among analysts and policy makers on 
the importance of risk and vulnerability in the lives of the poor, a development that has 
been helped by the greater availability of micro level data on patterns of wellbeing. Further, 
there is consensus, at least at a certain level of generality that the overall approach to social 
protection has to be systemic, even if implementation proceeds program by program. At the 
same time, I believe there is a consensus, especially after the global crises of the 1990s and 
the 2000s, that the international community needs to have mechanisms in place to provide 
resources rapidly to countries to protect their poor when a crisis hits. 
 
However, there remain disagreements, and I have posed these as challenges to the social 
protection community. I have argued that there is a tendency in the community to hide 
behind the “insurance” label when in fact social protection involves, and must involve, a 
large element of redistribution. There are also issues about whether resources are best spent 
on LICs or on MICs to strengthen social protection systems. How best to blend state and 
private, especially community provided, insurance is another challenge. Finally, I have 
cautioned against the current fad for CCTs, and raised the challenge of whether UCTs 
might in fact be more progressive in their impact. These and other challenges provide a rich 
agenda for analysis and policy experimentation in social protection. 
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